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This thesis aims to identify the security risks of open banking integrations as well as the 
awareness level of Estonian bank account holders on these risks. For these purposes, open 
banking Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) were analyzed, and how Third-Party 
Providers (TPPs) can create applications by using these APIs was pointed out. For this analysis, 
a qualitative method was the preference. Confidential data security/privacy and the man-in-
the-middle attack were the two essential risks identified. To understand the awareness level of 
Estonian bank account holders, 202 people were surveyed. As a sampling technique, 
convenient sampling was used. The quantitative method was employed to analyze the data. The 
findings indicated that while the vast majority of Estonian bank account holders are more aware 
of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) related concepts, more than half of them do not 
know what the man-in-the-middle attack is. The results also showed that men are more aware 
than women in both GDPR and MITM attack. Moreover, there was a positive and significant 
correlation between awareness in GDPR and MITM attack. The further analysis of the unaware 
group for MITM showed that they might be the potential victims for man-in-the-middle. 
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Today, with the rapid development of technology in every field, as in many industries, 
breakthroughs are made in the finance sector to modernize, digitalize and, provide quality and 
innovative services. The finance sector's digitalization finds its roots in the early 80s with 
internet banking's introduction by the Bank of Scotland (Tait & Davis, 1989). However, in the 
80s, since the vast majority of customers were not fully aware and ready for internet banking, 
internet banking was interrupted (ibid). In the 90s, the fast pace in information technology's 
development encouraged banks to launch internet banking onto the market again (ibid). After 
the second launch's success and the trend in using the internet bank among customers, the 
banking industry organically redefined its standards (ibid). As years passed, the number of 
internet bank users increased to a great extent. Therefore, to stay in the competition, having an 
internet bank became necessary for the banks. 
After internet banking became mainstream in the early 21st century, physically linked 
traditional banking activities started to leave their place to electronic-based service channels 
(Omarini, 2018). Digitalization went beyond internet banking and, the concept of mobile 
banking has been also a part of everyday life. Banks invested more in digitalization and 
innovation. However, their complex architectures and slow speed of development positioned 
banks to not meeting customer demands (Omarini, 2018). Businesses seeking to become a part 
of banking activities have seen it as a great opportunity (ibid). These businesses formed a new 
industry named fintech or financial technology. 
Fintech or financial technology, refers to a cross-disciplinary industry that aims to give 
fast, simple, and improved financial services (Leong, 2018). Competing with traditional 
financial services with their technological power, fintech firms act with the philosophy of 
facilitating their customers' lives over the world (ibid). Fintech firms, with their practicality, 
price advantage, customized user experience and, innovative services, have a prominent effect 
beyond expectations (Zveryakov et al., 2019).  
For the benefit of the European fintech industry, the most recent regulation is the 
implementation of the new EU Payment Service Directive (PSD2). Open Banking (also called 
API Banking), which is seen as an integral part of the developments taking place with PSD2, 
is defined as banks and their affiliates opening their data to the third parties via API 
(Zachariadis & Ozcan, 2017). European Union targeted increasing competition, transparency, 
innovation, and creating new opportunities for potential businesses with open banking. The 
power of accessing core bank services leads new third-party providers (TPP) to emerge to build 
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a sophisticated user experience (Gozman et al., 2018). With a more digitalized way, the usage 
of traditional banking continues to decrease. People start using the new platforms which use 
the banks’ services. At this phase, the matter of trust and convenience plays a significant role. 
In the battle between the new service providers, the ones that can build the feeling of security 
and practicableness will gain a victory (Dratva, 2020). 
Despite the many benefits of open banking, the emergence of new fintech companies 
brings along some concerns. Particularly the access of third parties to core banking services 
raises security concerns. The security part, which was previously only under the control of 
banks, will be a prominent matter for TPPs. 
In the current literature, studies are mostly for the security of open banking APIs. There 
is no comprehensive study anatomizing these risks, although few papers mention them. For 
instance, “The security of access to accounts under the PSD2” by Wolters and Jacobs is a study 
that touches upon the potential danger of TPPs accessing to account information of users 
theoretically (Wolters & Jacobs, 2019). However, this study is not clarifying the risks 
thoroughly. 
Understanding the possible security risks of open banking integrations is quite crucial. 
This cruciality arises from TPP access to customers` financial data. The more worrying part is 
TPPs can initiate a payment on behalf of their customers. Therefore, any misbehavior or 
vulnerability of TPPs can cause the leakage of confidential information and financial loss for 
customers.  
As mentioned earlier, most studies theoretically mention the risk of TPPs accessing 
financial data. The worse is none of the current studies focuses on the risk of financial loss. 
This study targets to shed light on these risks and explain them step by step.  
The essential purpose of this study is to point out the security risks of open banking 
integrations and to show the awareness level of Estonian bank account holders regarding this 
matter. For this purpose, open banking APIs are analyzed and Estonian bank account holders 
are surveyed. 
1.1. Research Questions 
In this thesis, the effort goes to find the answers to the following research questions: 
1. What are the security risks of open banking integrations? 
2. To what extent Estonian bank account holders are aware of security risks? 
The rest of the paper consists of literature review, methods and data, data analysis and 
interpretation, discussion of findings, conclusion, references and appendices. 
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2. Literature Review 
This part of the thesis overviews related scientific articles to create a basic 
understanding of open banking and security concepts. It is vital to explain respecting concepts 
to make readers more familiar with the research topic. Additionally, this part makes readers 
comprehend the absence of extensive study on this topic by reviewing related work. 
2.1. General Concepts 
As mentioned before, explaining necessary concepts is important for readers of the 
thesis. So, this part focuses on creating a basis for readers to understand the background of the 
research topic. 
2.1.1. PSD2 
PSD2 - Payment Service Directive is a revolutionary set of legal infrastructure rules 
that determine the method and functioning of new applications to be developed between 
institutions and third-party service providers in the UK and the European Union as of January 
13, 2018 (Scheja & Machielse, 2019). It is the second version of the Payment Services 
Directive designed by the European Union countries. It covers various topics from online 
payment methods to the information needed during payment for 28 EU member states (ibid). 
In essence, PSD2 expands the scope of PSD. For example, PSD2 opens the way to make 
transactions in third countries for a payment service provider in any country of the EU (Yawe 
& Mukisa, 2020). It also defines the cooperation and sharing between financial institutions and 
third-party payment service companies (ibid). To make electronic payments more secure, PSD2 
offers advanced security measures to be implemented by all payment service providers, 
including banks (ibid). Moreover, PSD2 encourages the development of innovative 
applications with low costs (Haubrich, 2018).  
2.1.2. The notion of Open Banking 
Open banking -the essential component of PSD2- stands for a system that allows third-
party service providers to access users' financial information and transactions within their 
consents (Farrow, 2020). In parallel to PSD2’s objectives, the development of new financial 
products, increasing the transparency and competition in the finance sector, improving user 
experience, increasing users' control on their data and, enabling banks to reach a broader client 
base are the open banking's targets (Premchand & Choudhry, 2019).  
There are three main actors in open banking services. The first party is the customer 
that refers to payment service user (PSU) in payment systems literature. PSU is a natural or 
legal entity initiating the payment order or benefiting from the payment service. The second 
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party is the banks where the customer’s payment account is available and the last party is the 
third-party providers where the customer’s data is shared. 
 
 
Figure 1: Parties in the open banking ecosystem. Compiled by author 
Account information service (AIS) and payment initiation service (PIS) are the two 
primary open banking categories. These services facilitate the emergence of payment initiation 
service providers (PISP) and account information service providers (AISP). Third party-
providers that obtain AISP and/or PISP license can benefit from AIS and PIS to create 
applications (Bär & Mortimer-Schutts, 2020).  
Open banking services promise to manage accounts in different banks in a single 
interface, reduce transaction costs, and benefit from an integrated payment market for 
customers (Dratva, 2020). The benefits of these services for banks are customer intelligence 
and financial risk management, better targeting on a customer basis, thus generating more 
revenue from customers (Döderlein, 2018). 
  
Figure 2: What PSD2 brings with account information service. Compiled by author. 
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2.1.3. Application Programming Interface (API) 
Keeping in mind that another name of open banking is API banking, having at least a 
basic knowledge about API helps to understand the operating mechanism of open banking. 
API is an interface that allows outside/remote access to the functions owned by an 
application, platform, or service within the permitted limits (Sagdeo, 2018). It is accurate to 
say API enables two applications to communicate with each other. 
The essential purpose of API usage is to open methods of an application to other 
applications. It eases to meet the remote data and information requests quickly. In this way, 
remote users who are allowed to operate in a single application can benefit from particular 
parameters. API generally serves to process real-time data one by one (Meng et al., 2018). The 
server processes the input with or without parameters sent by the server via the API and returns 
a result set or just a success notification (ibid). Updates to only a limited part of the data require 
a parameter. API, on the other hand, ensures that these operations are both fast and practical 
(ibid).  
To make API more understandable for non-technical readers, we can use the classic 
restaurant example. In a restaurant, we can consider the customer as an information/service 
requestor and the restaurant as an application that provides the information/service. When the 
customer requests information/service, the waiter is responsible for delivering this request. The 
waiter talks with a customer and conveys the customer request to the restaurant. When the 
service is ready, the waiter brings this service to the customer. So, two parties -customer and 
restaurant- communicate with the help of the waiter. Here the role of the waiter is the same as 
API. 
2.1.4. Financial Technologies (Fintech) 
As the name suggests, fintech, which has become increasingly popular in the 21st 
century, is the name given to technological solutions/companies in the financial sector (Ryu & 
Ko, 2020). These companies, combining finance and technology to provide easy and fast 
financial services, use agile methodologies (ibid). The finance sector is one of the industries 
that mostly affected by technological developments. This development prompts the finance 
sector to reshape and create new opportunities. Thanks to these new opportunities, fintech firms 
enter areas where big players cannot focus much (Llewellyn, 2018).  
Fintechs mainly operate in the field of payment systems. Besides, they provide services 
like lending, personal finance, retail and corporate investments, crowdfunding, asset 
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management, and money transfer (Imerman & Fabozzi, 2020). Fintechs mainly (Knewtson & 
Rosenbaum, 2020): 
• create digital products in the banking sector with personalized solutions 
• offer more technological and innovative products and services by focusing on more 
customer experience 
• provide a competitive price advantage 
• offer alternative services in the finance sector.  
As of 2019 April, the estimated number of fintech firms in the world is more than 3850 
(European Parliament. Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union., 2019). Only in 
the European Union, the number of fintech companies exceeds 1000 (ibid). In the EU, it should 
not be a surprise to see an increase in the number of these companies due to the charm of this 
industry and open banking implementation. 
2.1.5. GDPR and Data Security 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a regulation created across Europe 
to protect the personal data of EU citizens (McDowell, 2019). GDPR, which has entered into 
force in European Union member countries since 25 May 2018, is about ensuring the security 
of personal data existing in large institutions and organizations in the European Union member 
countries within the framework of the rules specified in the regulation (Li & Saxunová, 2020). 
The GDPR covers all businesses that host the personal data of their citizens within the borders 
of the European Union (Hsu, 2018). Even if the company's location is not located within the 
European Union, it is held responsible for the regulation because it collects the citizens' data 
(ibid).  
It is not allowed to process personal data unless it is done as specified in the regulation 
or has explicit consent from the data subject (data owner). The person concerned has the right 
to revoke this consent at any time. The GDPR also includes data stored in the past (Hernández 
et al., 2019). Harsh penalties and sanctions await businesses that do not comply with the GDPR. 
If the company does not comply with GDPR regulations, it has to pay up to 20 million Euros 
or 4% of its revenue depending on which one is higher (Skendzic et al., 2018).  
For companies, complying with GDPR is not sufficient to become trustable. Another 
important concept for them is data security. Data security is defined as the protection of data 
against unauthorized access  (Kumar et al., 2018). The most important focus in data security is 
to protect personal or corporate data while ensuring its privacy and verifying its integrity (ibid). 
Data comes first among the assets owned by institutions (Mukherjee, 2019). Institutions can 
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compile, change, acquire value, sell, turn into a product/service, or share their data (ibid). In 
this way, they earn income. As always, cyber attackers try to access this data and illegally earn 
revenue from this data (ibid). Unauthorized access to data causes many problems for companies 
or individual users (Kamiya et al., 2018). The most common cyber-attacks are theft of bank 
account information, theft of customer information in the database, and the encryption of data 
to demand a ransom (ibid). 
2.1.6. Man in the Middle Attack 
Man in the middle attack is an attack method that includes listening to the 
communication between two connections and capturing various data or changing data (Jain et 
al., 2016).  In MITM, communication between the two parties may be interrupted. Moreover, 
misleading communication may be created.  Capturing and manipulating packets on the 
network can summarize this attack type (ibid).  
In wireless networks, sheer broadcasted packets lead attackers to intercept packets 
without any preprocessing (Mallik, 2018). For this reason, areas that provide free Wi-Fi are the 
most suitable areas for MITM attacks (ibid). The contents of unencrypted packages can be 
easily read. Attackers in Wi-Fi areas direct network traffic to pass over them. Thus, the traffic 
of the people on that network starts to flow through the attacker (ibid). The attacker who 
captured this traffic can achieve many personal data like login credentials.  
We can give a postman example to explain it better. When someone wants to send a 
letter to his friend, he puts the letter in a mailbox. Later on, the postman who received the letter 
can read it or even change it. However, neither person nor his friend knows about this situation 
since the postman ensures communication. In this example, the MITM is the postman, and 
reading or changing the letter is the attack. 
Considering the hazardous results of the MITM attack, companies must secure their 
web applications (Imerman & Fabozzi, 2020). It is also significant for users to be aware of this 
threat and take precautions. 
2.2. Related Work 
In this part, we overview the studies which mention the security concerns of open 
banking integrations. When discussing open banking security, studies mostly focus on open 
banking itself, not the integration part. Therefore, the number of studies in the current literature 
is not satisfying enough to attract attention to integrations' security concerns. Additionally, 
these studies mostly touch upon the GDPR related issues theoretically. 
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The structure of open banking security itself covers access to APIs, authentication, and 
authorization. In addition to licenses, third parties need to have related certificates to access the 
APIs. Besides, since the customers need to use two factor authentication for authentication and 
authorization, open banking looks secure from its perspective(Basel Committee, 2019). 
However, as explained before, to say using open banking is secure, we should also be certain 
about TPPs’ security and how they build applications. 
2.2.1. Data Privacy and Security in Open Banking 
According to Wolters and Jacobs (2019), there are serious concerns regarding open 
banking security due to the third party's involvement. They claim the protection of personal 
data is not entirely met (ibid). There are many restrictions on access to accounts, and the GDPR 
refers to the provision of payment services (ibid). The account information service concept, 
however, is broad and covers a wide variety of services. Even though it helps the market to 
grow and provide innovative services for users, there is no clear privacy aftermath that can be 
originated from the benefiting of a large amount of account information (ibid). For these 
reasons, they believe the highest priority for PSD2 is the development of the market, not the 
privacy of the users (ibid). They explicitly mention, security and the privacy of the users are 
highly dependent on the PISPs and AISPs (ibid). Based on PSD2, TPPs are trustable if they 
hold the required licenses and certificates. But Wolters and Jacobs believe this might not be 
enough and result in data leakage (ibid). 
In another study, Romānova, et al., (2018) also described their worries that result from 
the sharing of personal data with third parties. They also believe data protection and privacy 
are not the top priority of PSD2 (ibid). Unclarity regarding accountability for security issues is 
another criticism of them for PSD2 (ibid). Thus, the reputation of PSD2 and open banking 
might fall into disrepute. In their study, together with addressing the security concerns, they 
also conducted interviews with 263 people to understand the security, risk, and privacy 
perceptions of users (ibid). The results showed that users care most about security (with a score 
of 2.11 out of 5). On the other hand, they give the lowest importance to privacy (with a score 
of 1.91 out of 5). 
Kottayil (2020), in his study, also criticizes open banking regarding consumer security. 
He highlights the absence of a diffusive liability model in case of data leakage. According to 
Kottayil, PSD2 does not have enough security and privacy protocols (ibid). He suggests PSD2 
build a conceptual model to protect the consumers.  Otherwise, he believes open banking’s 
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potential can be misused and, consumers may encounter new security threats such as fraud and 
scams (ibid). 
2.2.2. Man-in-the-middle Attack and Risk of Unauthorized Payments in Open Banking 
Unfortunately, in the current literature, the number of people who see the man in the 
middle attack risk for open banking is quite limited. For instance, the author checked Business 
Source Complete, Scopus, Web of Science, ScienceDriect, Google Scholar databases with 
man-in-the-middle attack and open banking keywords together, results do not provide much 
study which include these two concepts together and they explain MITM in other fields. For 
example, one study (Luvanda et al., 2014) focuses on the MITM within the context of mobile 
applications. Since we are specifically interested in MITM in OB there are not many studies to 
overview.  
Most researchers touched upon only the data security and privacy parts when examining 
open banking risks. Some of them also see unauthorized transactions as a risk but as mentioned 
earlier only a few studies discuss man-in-the-middle attack risk. We believe the reason for such 
scarcity results from the trust in authentication security of open banking. However, only 
authentication security is not sufficient to secure the transactions. 
Steve Mansfield-Devine’s article (2016) is one of the rare studies that address the risk 
of a man-in-the-middle attack in the open banking system. In his work, benefiting from the 
interview with Andrew Whaley, he theoretically explains how this type of attack can occur 
(ibid). Again, the root cause of such a risk is involvement of third parties. Differing from the 
data security and privacy concerns, when a man-in-the-middle attack occurs, the financial loss 
is a matter of question. Even though banks check the identity of the third parties with the help 
of certificates, it does not guarantee the correctness of the data which is assumed to be sent by 
a particular TPP (ibid). To make it more specific, after authentication of the user, when the 
third party wants to initiate a payment, it prepares the request and sends it to a corresponding 
bank. If man-in-the-middle manages to interfere before the request reaches the bank, he will 
find a chance to edit the request. In this request editing, a man-in-the-middle can change the 
creditor IBAN to which the money goes and keep the TPP identifier the same. During this 
process, since a customer is not aware of this change, the money goes to a different IBAN from 
the one customer/TPP intends to send the money. 
In its report (2018), Institute of International Finance points out the risks of the 
unauthorised payments which may induce financial loss. By unauthorised payments, they refer 
to the payments which are made without the permission of customers (ibid). They explain that 
SECURITY RISK OF OB INTEGRATIONS AND AWARENESS 
 
16 
such transactions are most likely to occur if authentication credentials are captured by 
unwanted parties(ibid). However, this report does not take into account that even if login 
credentials are accessed by unwanted parties, it is still not possible to complete payment 
without user confirmation unless the customer’s bank exempts this rule. 
3. Methods and Data 
In this part of the thesis, researcher explains the appropriate methodologies which are 
used for the analysis. In addition, data that is used for analysis is defined. 
There are various methods to carry out researches in the academic world. One of the 
most prominent matters of research is choosing a suitable research method. Thus, the 
methodology should be determined first when deciding on research. In the following part three 
different research methods are evaluated and chosen for the data analysis. The study employed 
the mixed method research approach (qualitative and quantitative). 
3.1. Research Approach 
Qualitative research is a method in which qualitative data collection methods such as 
observation, interview, and document analysis are used (Choy, 2014).  Researchers follow the 
qualitative approach to reveal perceptions and events realistically and holistically in the natural 
environment (Moffatt, 2015). This approach prioritizes researching and understanding social 
phenomena within the environment they connect to, with an understanding based on theorizing. 
In qualitative research, the collected answers are essentially not numerical answers. 
Qualitative research method has the following limitations (Atieno, 2009). First of all, it 
does not provide a statistical representation of the collected data (ibid). Responses with this 
form of research cannot usually be measured. Only comparisons are possible. Secondly, the 
limited sample size of the research may be problematic in collecting authentic data (ibid).  
Different viewpoints are also needed to avoid making a costly mistake when making an 
important decision. Lastly, since qualitative research focuses on individual experiences, the 
findings are almost impossible to replicate (ibid). Tomorrow, even the same person will have 
a different viewpoint than they have today (ibid). That implies that it can be tough to verify the 
data obtained through qualitative research, which can lead some to doubt the conclusions that 
researchers generate through this method.  
Despite its limitations, the author benefits from the qualitative approach in open 
banking documentation analysis since document analysis is a dimension of qualitative method.  
Quantitative research, on the other hand, is a type of research that can make 
observations, measure, and express them numerically by objectifying the events and facts 
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(Sukamolson, 2005). The purpose of quantitative research is to observe the behavior of 
individuals in society, to measure objectively utilizing experiments, and to explain with 
numbers (ibid). To interpret the connections between the facts, statistical data are taken into 
consideration and, the results are expressed numerically. Since this method is based on 
numbers, it is necessary to determine the sample representing the event or phenomenon 
completely and to ask the right questions.  
As in qualitative research approach, quantitative research has some limitations (Queirós 
et al., 2017). First of all, qualitative research does not care about people's motivation when 
sharing an opinion or making a decision (ibid). The objective of the information gathering 
process is to paint a picture of what is happening in the selected demographic at that time. 
Secondly, quantitative research does not give participants the option to review responses (ibid). 
Even if the information seems confusing or is invalid, the answers given to researchers must 
stand alone. The quantitative option has very few opportunities to ask for clarity instead of 
following a tangent as other methods use. Researchers always face the risk that the responses 
or features given in a quantitative study are not an accurate representation of the entire 
population (ibid). Because of the necessary assumptions for this work, it is relatively easy to 
come to false conclusions or correlations. Even the randomized sampling that takes place is not 
100 percent accurate to remove bias from the equation.  
Despite the limitations of the quantitative approach, the author benefits from it. This 
mainly stems from the need of data collection and analyzing the collected data statistically. 
A mixed approach is a research approach in which the researcher integrates two data 
sets collected as quantitative data (closed-ended) and qualitative data (open-ended) to 
understand research questions and then draws conclusions using the advantages of merging 
these two data sets (Azorín & Camero, 2010). The basic assumption of this approach is that it 
has more advantages for the researcher to combine statistical trends (quantitative data) with 
stories and personal experiences (qualitative data) compared to using any of these methods 
alone (ibid). Compared to qualitative and quantitative approaches, the mixed approach has 
fewer limitations. 
To sum it up, for this thesis, data is collected in a quantitative way since it allows to 
collect a good amount of data. Also, to analyze the collected data and generalize the results, 
the author makes use of the quantitative approach. Since there is also a need for document 
analysis, the author also draws on a qualitative approach. Therefore, based on the 
characteristics of the research, it is correct to say that the mixed approach is the selected 
research approach. 
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3.2. Questionnaire and Data Collection  
This thesis benefits from the book “Research Methods for Business students” to create 
a questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2009).  In the book, it is suggested to have a roadmap to build 
a well-organized questionnaire. First of all, the researcher should know what kind of data is 
required and what kind of questions should be asked.  Secondly, the researcher needs to 
determine how he can reach to respondents.  
The book states that two types of questionnaire designs decide the way to collect 
responses from respondents. The first type is interview-administrated, in which the researcher 
conducts interviews with the respondents one by one. The second type is self-administrated, in 
which respondents fill the questions by themselves without the researcher's involvement. 
Considering that reaching out to all the respondents is so time taking and costly, the author 
decided to choose a self-administrated approach. This approach eases to collect responses from 
a large number of respondents in a short time. Moreover, this approach lets respondents answer 
the question without any impact in the absence of the researcher. To expedite the data collection 
process, the author chose to held the questionnaire online. 
In order not to take so much time of the respondents, the author designed the survey 
with close-ended questions. In the questionnaire, it is decided to have three different types of 
questions. The first group of questions is demographic questions. With these questions such as 
age, gender and, country of nationality, understanding the demographic pattern of respondents 
is aimed. The second group of questions is general questions. These questions are asked to 
figure out if respondents have Estonian bank account and for how long they are the customer 
of the bank, how frequently they shop online, which payment methods they prefer and what 
challenges they face in online shopping. The last group of questions is asked to understand 
Estonian bank account holders’ security awareness level. If they heard about the man-in-the-
middle attack or if they have entered their internet bank login credentials into another website 
are the example of this group of questions. 
The author used google forms to prepare the online questionnaire. After it was created, 
the author shared it with people. 
3.3. Sample size and sample technique  
The sample of the research consisted of Estonian bank account holders. In the sample 
there are people from different professions, educational background and social classes. To 
reach out all the people in the sample, the author used different channels. The survey shared in 
the social media groups. Also, it was sent in the emails to different companies. The survey was 
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open for answers in Estonia from 1 February 2021 to 5 March 2021. In total, 213 people shared 
their responses. The number of people who specified that they do not have Estonian bank 
accounts was 11. Since this survey is only interested in Estonian bank account holders, the 
number of valid responses for the survey is accepted as 202. Convenient sampling was the 
sampling technique to reach out all 213 people. 
3.4. Ethical standards 
To follow the ethical standards, all the participants were communicated that this 
research is for study purposes and none of their responses are shared with any other individual 
or institution. None of the respondents were forced to involve in the research. The purpose of 
the study was shared with the respondents. Thanks to an online questionnaire, respondents were 
not under the influence of the researcher or any other party. The researcher did not take any 
action to manipulate the results. Also, while selecting the sample, the author did not intend to 
find a specific group of people. 
3.5. Open Banking Documentations 
As mentioned earlier, the author benefits from the publicly available open banking 
documentations. The reason to examine these documents is because TPPs create the 
applications based on them. PSD2 mandated banks to create these documentations and share 
them publicly so that TPPs can benefit. Since PSD2 introduced a standard for these 
documentations, there is no need to examine the documentation of all banks in Europe. For that 
reason, the author decided to analyze the documentation of three banks which have operations 
in Estonia. It is correct to say that for the selection of these banks, purposive sampling is used 
since these can be considered as the representatives of all banks in Europe. In the analysis, the 
author explains the usage of APIs and what kind of risks are involved with this usage. 
4. Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The author divides this part into two categories as the overview of open banking APIs 
and the evaluation of the online questionnaire. In the first part, the author explains the general 
structure of open banking APIs and present some visuals for payment flow by using PIS. In the 
second part, the author displays the results of the questionnaire. 
4.1. The Overview of Open Banking APIs 
In this part, the author reviews and explains the publicly available open banking APIs 
of primary banks which operate in Estonia (Swedbank, SEB, and LHV). It is significant to get 
the readers familiar with APIs to understand the next parts. Because sample models in the 
SECURITY RISK OF OB INTEGRATIONS AND AWARENESS 
 
20 
empirical presentation are built based on the open banking API. Since the general structure of 
open banking API is standard for LHV, SEB, and Swedbank, the author does not examine these 
singly. Instead, the explanation covers the general structure. 
Open banking APIs consist of three major parts. These are OAuth, account information 
services, and payment initiation services. 
 
 
Figure 3: The overview of open banking API. Compiled by author. 
OAuth refers to the authorization. This part is necessary to use the other two services. 
It lets the user log in as well as checks the identity of TPP. There are two different approaches 
to log in the user. The first one is the redirect approach, in which the user is redirected to the 
corresponding bank’s page to enter his credentials and confirm the login with a security device. 
The second approach, named decoupled, allows third parties to collect the user’s login 
credentials and deliver them to the bank. When a third party gets a response from a bank 
indicating credentials are correct from the bank, it presents confirmation details to the user and, 
the user completes the authentication. Once the user completes authentication, the third party 
gets two different tokens: access and refresh tokens. Access token carries the information of 
the user’s identity in a decrypted way and, a refresh token is used to refresh the access token. 
While the access token is valid for one hour, a refresh token is valid for 90 days. The third-
party can use account information and payment initiation services on behalf of the user by 
using these tokens. 
Account information service API, which is a subset of open banking API, consists of 
several parts. In the current implementation, third parties having the access token can only use 
an account list endpoint. The account list endpoint only returns the account numbers of the 
user. However, third parties can request consent from the user to access other details of account 
information such as transaction history and account balances. If the user grants consent to share 
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his account information details, a third party can access these details for 90 days unless the user 
terminates the consent. At the end of 90 days, the user needs to grant a new consent. As long 




Figure 4: The account information and consent service endpoints. (LHV Open Banking PSD2 REST API) 
Payment initiation service API is evident from its name allows initiating a payment on 
behalf of the service user. Saying this service will be used by payment service providers is not 
a surprise. In payment initiation service API, all the necessary endpoints which complete a 
transaction are available. As in the account information service, the prerequisite to use this 
service is to have an access token that indicates the user logged in previously. When the user 
wants to make a payment for a service, a third party initiates the payment. The correctness of 
the details such as access token, payer’s account number, format of the currency, receiver name 
and, receiver’s account number is controlled by the bank. If payment initiation details are 
correct, the bank validates the payment initiation request and allows TPP to get the 
confirmation from the user. Again, as in the OAuth process, the user can confirm the payment 
on the bank's page (redirect approach) or the third party’s page (decoupled approach). Finally, 
when all the other checks such as fraud and balance are completed by the bank, the transaction 
takes place. 




Figure 5: The sequence diagram of payment flow in decoupled approach. Compiled by author. 
From the Figure 5 which captures the new decoupled approach, it is visible that users 
do not have to interact with the bank to complete a payment. It seems PSD2 aimed to improve 
customer experience and convenience by preventing redirection to bank for authentication and 
payment confirmation. In the Appendix B the sample user interface for decoupled payment 
flow can be seen.  
In this flow, customers can enter their internet bank login credentials into TPP’s page. 
Also, TPPs can show payment details and ask customers to confirm the payment with their 
Strong Customer Authentication device (e.g., Smart-ID or Mobile-ID in Estonia). The payment 
flow starts with customers inputting their login credentials into the TPP’s page. It means, now, 
TPPs can see and even store customers’ login credentials before sending a request to the bank. 
But what TPPs can do with the login credentials is limited. By themselves, customers’ login 
credentials cannot be used, because Strong Customer Authentication is mandated by PSD2. 
Therefore, even if the user’s login credentials are stolen by TPP or some other party, it cannot 
be used without the user authenticate himself with PIN1. 
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After successful authentication, in the next step of the payment flow, TPP can access 
users’ account list without balances and transactions. Once they get the account list, they 
present it to the user for selection. Once user selects and clicks pay, TPP can send payment 
initiation request to the bank. During this process, the request might be changed by unwanted 
parties and even if user sees a different amount and receiver in the user interface, these can be 
different in the request. 
4.2. The Analysis of Online Questionnaire  
In this part of the thesis, the author visually presents findings from the questionnaire 
with graphs and numbers. The author presents the collected data as demographic, general, and 
specific, as previously mentioned. 
4.2.1. Demographic Questions 
From the 202 valid respondents, 97 of them were female and 105 of them were male. 
The following graph shows the numbers visually. 
 
Graph 1: Distribution by Gender (Author) 
After their gender, people were asked to specify their age group. In total 9 different 
options were presented to people for selection. The last age group, 66+, was not selected by 
any of the respondents. The number of respondents who are in the 25-31 age group was the 
highest with 77. This age group was followed by the 32-38 age group with 36 respondents. The 
number of respondents who are in 18-24 and 39- 45 age groups are quite close with 21 and 20 
respectively. In the 46-52 age group, there were only 5 respondents. 53-59, <18, and 60-65 age 
groups have less respondents with the numbers 3, 2, and 1 respectively. In the following graph, 
the numbers can be seen visually. 




Graph 2: Distribution by Age Groups (Author) 
As a last demographic question, respondents were asked to specify their country of 
nationality. People from 23 different nationalities answered the survey. These countries 
alphabetically are Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, USA, and Uzbekistan. As expected, Estonia was the highest number 
with 139. There was only one respondent from China, France, Germany, Kazakhstan, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, and the USA. The countries with two respondents are Belarus, 
Finland, Lithuania, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan. Georgia, India, Iran, and Latvia have three 
respondents. Most representatives in this survey after Estonia are from Azerbaijan and Turkey 
with ten respondents per each country. These countries were followed by Ukraine and Russia 
with respectively 7 and 5 respondents. In the following graph, the distribution was presented. 
 
Graph 3: Distribution by Country of Nationality (Author) 
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4.2.2. General Questions 
As stated earlier, the general questions are asked to understand the position and 
behavior of Estonian bank accounts holders. First, respondents were asked to indicate how long 
they have been customers of their banks. 202 Estonian bank account holders responded to this 
question with the following numbers. 8 of them are less than one year, 66 of them between one 
and three years, 18 of them between three and five years and 110 of them have been customers 
of their banks for more than five years. 
 
Graph 4: The number of years as a customer in banks (Author) 
Secondly, respondents were asked if they shop online or not. Except one Estonian 
female, all of the Estonian bank account holders responded with yes to this question. As a third 
question, the question, “How often do you shop online?” was asked. 5 different option, 
“Multiple times in a week”, “Once a week”, “Once a month”, “Less than once a month” and 
“Never” were presented for selection. Only one person answered with “Never”. Most common 
answer was “Once a month” with the number of 74. While 41 people answered “Once a week”, 
38 people said “Multiple times in a week”. The answer which shows the least frequency, “Less 
than once a month” was selected by 47 respondents. 
 
Graph 5: Online shopping frequency of respondents (Author) 
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After this question, respondents were asked to indicate the payment method that they 
used most frequently during the online shopping. For this question, the author presented four 
different options: Debit/Credit card, Bank payment, PayPal and other. The results for this 
question demonstrated that Debit/Credit card is the most frequently used payment method 
among respondents. While Bank payments were the second, the option of other came at the 
bottom of the list. 
   
Graph 6: Most frequently used payment methods by respondents (Author) 
As a last general question, most common challenges that respondents encountered was 
posed. For this question, respondents were allowed to choose multiple options. The options 
were “Complicated checkout process”, “Missing payment options”, “Slow payment 
processing”, “Redirection to third party payment service provider”, “Missing payment 
confirmation information”, and “None of the above”. Based on the results, the most common 
challenge for respondents is “Redirection to third party payment service provider”. This option 
was selected by 101 people. The results of the other options can be seen in the following graph. 
 
 
Graph 7: Most common challenges during the online shopping (Author) 
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4.2.3. Specific Questions 
There are three sub-objectives of gathering data with specific questions all of which 
served to respond to the second research question. The first one is to measure the familiarity of 
Estonian bank account holders regarding security and privacy concepts. To meet this objective 
two questions were asked. These questions are if they have heard about General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. The motivation to ask such 
general question is to understand whether they are even aware of the concepts so that minimum 
unawareness can be measured for sure. 160 of 202 Estonian bank account holders responded 
said they have heard about GDPR. On the other hand, the familiarity with the MITM attack 
was lower compared to GDPR. More than half of the Estonian bank account holders, 110, said 
they did not hear about MITM attack before. 
 
Graph 8: Familiarity with the terms GDPR and MITM Attack (Author) 
To calculate the correlation coefficient between awareness in GDPR and MITM, phi 
coefficient formula is used because both variables are binary variables. The calculations are 
made based on the following table and formula (Aaron et al., 1998): 
 
 
In the table and formula, x represents the answers for GDPR question and y represents 
the answers for MITM questions. So, n is the combined answers for two questions. After 
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calculations phi coefficient is found as 0.40 (r=0.40, p<0.05). This shows that there is a 
significant and positive correlation between awareness in GDPR and MITM attack. So, if a 
person is aware of GDPR, he is more likely to be aware of MITM attack or vice versa. 
The author also checked whether awareness for GDPR and MITM attack differs based 
on the gender. For that, the author benefited from hypothesis testing for two-sample 
proportions. 
Here our hypothesizes are: 
H0: p1=p2  
H1: p1≠ p2 




















MITM awareness values for males and females (Author) 
Here we calculate Z for GDPR as 3.33. Since P(Z) is 0.000868< α we reject the null 
hypothesis and we can conclude males are more aware than females in GDPR. For awareness 
in MITM attack, Z value is 6.84 and P(Z) is 0.00001< α we reject the null hypothesis. Again, 
we can conclude that males are more aware for MITM attack than females.  
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The second objective of specific questions is to understand Estonian bank account 
holders’ trust to banks and fintech firms. For that, they were asked to rate their trust level on a 
scale of 1 to 5. The results indicated that all of the respondents trust banks more than fintechs. 
None of the respondents rate their trust level with 1 for the banks. However, 5 respondents 
gave the score of 1 for their trust level to fintechs. On average, while average score level is 
3.34 for fintechs, it was 4.25 for the banks. 
 
Graph 9: Trust level for banks and fintechs (Author) 
The third and last purpose of the specific questions is to collect data about Estonian 
bank account holders' behavior during online shopping. This type of questions is quite crucial 
since they help to build a relationship with security risks in open banking. In the questionnaire, 
the author asked three questions to understand the behavior during online shopping. To 
comprehend if they used decoupled approach previously, the respondents are asked to specify 
if they entered their internet bank login credentials into another website. 73 people said yes to 
this question, while 129 people said no.  
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Graph 10: Whether respondents use their login credentials in some other webpage (Author) 
On the other hand, the author asked if they ever encountered suspicious activity during 
online shopping. 38 people said yes to this question. After this question, they were asked how 
they reacted to that. For this question, the author presented four different options: “Cancelled 
the payment process”, “Contacted my bank”, “Contacted e-shop”, “Nothing, I waited to see 
what happens”. Interestingly, 7 of these 38 people answered with “Nothing, I waited to see 
what happens”. From these 38 people, it is clear that the most common reaction is cancelling 
the payment processing. And the least common reaction is contacting e-shop with two answers. 
  
Graph 11: Reactions in case of suspicious activity during online shopping (Author) 
5. Discussion of Findings 
In this section, the author discussed the security risks of open banking integrations 
based on open banking APIs. He would further discuss the awareness level of Estonian bank 
account holders. From the findings it can be observed that Estonian bank account holders who 
are aware of GDPR are more likely to be also aware of MITM attack. 
5.1. Data Privacy and Security in Open Banking 
Unlike payment initiation service, there are not similar applications of Account 
Information Service (AIS) before PSD2. Since AIS is a new and broad concept as discussed 
by Wolters and Jacobs (2019) it raises some concerns. These concerns mainly stem from 
permitting TPPs to access customers’ data. With the chance of accessing customer data, there 
is no doubt that TPPs create new applications to ease users’ life. It is expected that these 
applications would allow customers to see their accounts and transaction histories in different 
banks in one application. So, for the customers who have accounts only in one bank, there is 
no benefit of using such applications since the functionality would be the same as their mobile 
or internet bank application. For the customers who have accounts in different banks, these 
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applications might be convenient. However, there is a trade-off at this point. Customers who 
want to have a more convenient way to see their balances and transaction histories in different 
banks should be careful at who they are giving access to. They should keep in mind that, after 
giving consent to TPP, TPP can access all of their account numbers, account balances, and 
transaction histories. As explained in the overview of the open banking APIs section, refresh 
tokens are valid for 90 days. Therefore, once the consent is granted, TPP can access all this 
information for 90 days without asking to the user. Even though there is no need to store any 
of this data in the database since whenever requested banks provide this information, TPP can 
store this information into their database. If we think skeptical, we can even say that TPPs can 
sell this information to some other firms to make more money. Even if we exclude this option, 
TPPs can be attacked by some other parties and in case of security leakages all stored data can 
be stolen by attackers. So, all the confidential information such as balances, money transfers 
and purchases can be seen by unwanted parties. At this juncture, we can say that one of the 
risks of open banking integrations is personal data security and privacy as a response to first 
research question. This confirms the worries of Romānova (2018), regarding the data security 
and privacy. 
When it comes to awareness of Estonian bank account holders, the awareness in regard 
of GDPR is around 79.2%. So, it is expected these people to be more careful while allowing 
TPPs to reach their data. The more preferable option is not to use TPPs AIS application. 
The study also found a difference in awareness based on the gender. Based on the 
statistical test, the results showed that males are more aware than females in GDPR. This may 
be associated with the fact that males are more interested in the information technology (IT) 
related concepts and IT sector is more preferrable for men. 
5.2. Man-in-the-middle Attack and Risk of Unauthorized Payments in Open 
Banking 
Although there are some Payment Initiation Service applications before PSD2, PSD2 
introduces new features. In the previous applications, customers who want to make a payment 
from their bank account have to be redirected to their bank’s page for authentication and 
payment confirmation. However, now, PSD2 allows TPPs to create a different payment flow. 
In this flow, customers can enter their internet bank login credentials into TPP’s page. Also, 
TPPs can show payment details and ask customers to confirm the payment with their Strong 
Customer Authentication device (e.g., Smart-ID or Mobile-ID in Estonia). Basically, for 
customers, there is no need to interact with their banks to complete payment. From the user 
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experience point of view, it is so convenient. However, there is a security risk here. As stated 
above, in case of security issues man-in-the-middle can read or even change the data during 
the communication between two parties. So, the most crucial part is MITM can change the 
payment initiation request. This request includes information such as receiver IBAN and 
amount. If MITM capture this request and change it, the amount might be different and money 
can go to different bank account than the targeted receiver’s account. During this process, the 
user has no chance to realize to who money is transferred. Because in user interface, everything 
is shown as expected but the data is changed in backend where user has no access. 
In addition to MITM attack risk, there is also a risk of unauthorized transaction risk. 
However, this risk depends on the bank’s position on whether to allow some transactions to be 
completed without strong customer authentication. For example, some banks allow payments 
that are lower than certain amounts to be completed without the user’s confirmation. As 
explained previously, oAuth services are required to use PIS. So, once the user uses one TPPs 
service, his refresh token is valid for 90 days. With the refresh token, the first authentication 
step can be skipped if TPPs design their application in that way. If banks allow payment to be 
completed without confirmation, payment can be made without user involvement. But the good 
news is even if TPP or some unwanted party make such transactions, the liability is on the bank 
which allows unauthorized transactions (2018). Thus, the bank needs to make a refund to the 
user for such transactions. 
So, answering the first research question, it is correct to say that there is a risk of MITM 
attack as stated by Mansfield-Devine (2016). However, Mansfield-Devine does not mention 
any detail where and how it can occur. On the other hand, this study says it can occur in the 
decoupled payment flow. 
Regarding the awareness in MITM, more than half of the Estonian bank account holders 
have not heard about this concept previously. The results also showed that females are less 
aware of MITM attack than males. This is expected when the fact more males work in IT sector 
than females is taken into account. Within 110 people who are not aware of the MITM attack, 
53 of them entered their internet bank login credentials into the TPPs page which is an indicator 
of usage of the decoupled payment flow. 30 of these 53 people trust TPPs with a rate of 4 or 
more. From these numbers, it can be interpreted that 14.85% of all Estonian bank account 
holders do not know about the MITM attack, use the decoupled payment flow and highly trust 
TPPs. This group of people can be a target victim for such attacks. This unawareness might be 
because of the low amount of such attack type in the past or the low level of information 
technology literacy. 




Figure 6: The distribution of respondents who are not aware of MITM attack. Compiled by author. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to point out security risks of open banking integrations 
and show the awareness level of Estonian bank account holders regarding this matter.  
With the analysis of open banking APIs, it was envisioned how TPPs can create 
applications by using the APIs. It turned out that, applications which can be built with AIS 
have a risk of revealing confidential information such as account balances and transaction 
history. For payment service provider applications which is possible to create with PIS APIs, 
the main risk comes with the new decoupled payment flow. Analysis showed that, in this 
payment flow, there is an invitation to man-in-the-middle. MITM attack can cause financial 
loss for the users of the decoupled payment flow. 
As mentioned, the second purpose of the study was to show awareness level of Estonian 
bank account holders. In this regard, people were surveyed. Based on the results of the survey, 
it is understood that familiarity and awareness of GDPR which ensures data privacy is higher 
than MITM attack. 
Overall, I hope this study brings awareness to the payment service users while using 
the financial services. The readers of this thesis will be more cautious during their online 
shopping process. Moreover, from the service provider’s point of view, I believe this study will 
be helpful while building new applications if the highlighted risks are taken into account.  
Even though this study showed the security risks of open banking integrations and 
awareness level of Estonian bank account holders, there were some limitations for better 
results. These limitations and recommendations for further studies are discussed in the 
following parts. 




For the online questionnaire, only 213 people shared their answers. With a longer period 
of availability of survey, the number could be higher and more representative results could be 
achieved to generalize the findings of all Estonian bank account holders. 
Another limitation was the lack of previous AIS application since it is a new concept. 
If those would exist, respondents’ behavior and awareness level for data security and privacy 
could be measured more accurately. 
6.2. Recommendations 
This study focused on the risks of open banking integrations and pointed out two major 
risks as data privacy/security and MITM attack. Since PSD2 and open banking are new 
concepts, they are not mature yet. Despite these risks, they provide new opportunities for TPPs 
and a better user experience for customers. For further studies, it is highly recommended to 
work on how TPPs can ensure security and mitigate these risks or what is the current position 
of the TPPs who build applications with open banking APIs. 
For the users of open banking services, it is highly recommended not to share their data 
with TPPs which they don’t know. Moreover, while making a payment, they should prefer the 
redirect approach which is more secure than decoupled approach. 
Considering the existing risks in open banking, TPPs that want to earn customers’ trust 
should build their system as secure as possible. For AIS application service providers, it is 
crucial not to store any customer data. To convince the customers to use their services, going 
through an auditing process and communicating this with customers might be helpful. 
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Appendix B- User Interface of Decoupled Payment Flow 
   
                      Step 1                         Step 2 
  










AVATUD PANGANDUSE INTEGRATSIOONIDE TURVALISUSE ANALÜÜS JA 
EESTI PANGAKONTOT OMAVETE ISIKUTE TEADLIKKUS NENDEGA 
KAASNEVATEST RISKIDEST 
Antud magistritöö eesmärgiks on identifitseerida avatud panganduse integratsioonide 
turvariskid ning Eesti pangakonto omavate inimeste teadlikkuse tasemega nendest riskidest. 
Selleks keskendub töö programmiliidese analüüsimisele ning kuidas kolmandate osapoolte 
pakkujad kasutavad neid programmiliideseid. Täpsemate tulemuste saamiseks kasutati töö 
teoreetilises pooles programmiliideste uurimiseks kvantitatiivset meetodeid. Kvantitatiivse 
meetodi andmete kogumiseks kasutati mugavusvalimi tehnikat, kus küsitleti 202 Eesti 
pangakontot omavat inimest. Konfidentsiaalsete andmete turva/privaatsuse ja inimese 
keskmises rünnakus olid kaks suuremat riski, mis magistritöö tuvastas. Kvantitatiivsest 
analüüsist tuli välja, et suurem osa Eesti pangakonto omavatest inimestest on teadlik 
isikuandmete kaitse üldmääruse mõistetest, kuid enam kui pooled ei teadnud, mis tähendab 
inimene keskmises rünnakus mõiste. Tulemused näitasid, et mehed on naistest teadlikumad 
GDPR ja vahendusrünnete (MITM) osas. Lisaks on positiivne korrelatsioon GDPR ja 
vahendusrünnete (MITM) teadlikkuse vahel. Edasine analüüs antud grupi kohta leidis, et just 
nemad võivad potentsiaalselt olla ohvrid inimene keskel rünnakule. 
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